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Abstract
Late-modern penal power has been described as ‘tight’. Through the increasing use of inde-
terminate sentences and psychological assessment, and the growing insistence that prisoners
engage in self-government, the prison monitors and seeks to change those it holds. This tight and
disciplinarian power is often described as contributing to the increasing fragmentation and ato-
misation of the prisoner community. However, this article, which is based on research conducted
in a English medium-security prison for men convicted of sex offences, argues that tightness can
operate through the prisoner community, in a process which it terms ‘lateral regulation’. It shows
that prisoners spend a lot of time observing, categorising and policing their peers, in ways which
replicate and often uphold the more formal systems of power. However, the relationship between
these two systems of power is complex, and prisoners’ collective self-regulation can conflict with
and challenge the demands of the penal institution, in a way which reveals some of the weaknesses
in the institution’s disciplinary gaze, and indicates the normative motivations underlying this
regulation.
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He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication.
Foucault (1975/1991: 200)
Bentham’s Panopticon is ‘the architectural figure’ (Foucault, 1975/1991: 200) of disciplinary
power. Its design consists of a rotunda separated into multitudes of cells, each accommodating a
single prisoner, and a central tower containing an inspector whose role is to observe, classify and
control them. The design’s central innovation is that prisoners cannot know when the inspector is
looking at them, and so they must always behave as if they are being watched. Foucault maintains
that this ‘illusion of constant surveillance’ (Božovič, 1995: 16) creates a mechanism of authority
and obedience which enables the Panopticon to create and sustain ‘a power relation independent of
the person who exercises it; in short, the inmates themselves should be caught up in a power
situation of which they themselves are the bearers’ (Foucault, 1975/1991: 201). Discipline thus
becomes something which is not done to prisoners but done through them.
As is hinted at in the quotation from Foucault in this article’s title, however, the effect of the
Panopticon is created not just through its invisible gaze, but through its individualising tendencies.
Prisoners in the Panopticon were to be held in separate cells, with walls between them creating
order through ‘lateral invisibility’ (p. 200). By preventing prisoners from communicating with or
even seeing each other, the Panopticon would also inhibit them from influencing, planning with or
supporting each other – indeed, from doing anything that might challenge centralised power of the
inspector. In the Panopticon, there would be no such thing as society:
The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collec-
tive effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities. From the point of view
of the guardian, it is replaced by a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised; from the point of
the view of the inmates, by a sequestered and observed solitude. (p. 201)
Thus isolated from each other, prisoners in the Panopticon would be unable to develop any of
the relationships, loyalties, shared cultural practices or norms which might nurture a sense of sol-
idarity or collective identity. All that would be left would be the individual and their relationship
with the inspector.
The Panopticon was never fully instantiated, and most prisoners are not held in solitary con-
ditions. As a result, most penal institutions enable, even enforce, a degree of social life. It is the
relationship between the prisoner society and the formal penal institution – these two potentially
conflicting systems of power – which is the focus of this article, which considers whether Bentham
was right to consider the prisoner society to be a threat to institutional hegemony. As this brief
review of literature on ‘the two intertwined disciplinary frameworks of prison life’ (Lowman,
1986: 239) makes clear, the relationship is more complicated and multidirectional than that.
Literature review: Penal power and the prisoner society
The interaction between the prisoner society and the formal system of power has been one of the
key areas of focus in prison sociology. Many scholars have argued, with Bentham, that lateral
relationships can enable inmates to resist institutional power, for example, by allowing them to
sustain backstage areas, free places and group territories in which they can imitate freedom and
behave authentically (Goffman, 1961). Much research in this area had focused on the inmate code,
the so-called ‘criminalistic ideology’ (Clemmer, 1950: 317) which consists of a series of norms
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advocating stoicism and discouraging excessive involvement with staff. By advocating for and
following this code, the argument goes, inmates can step away from the mainstream and align
themselves with deviant values (Lowman, 1986). In so doing, the code creates the conditions for a
positive and honourable collective identity for prisoners, and a normative community which exists
in opposition to the prison as a formal institution.
The prisoner community does not have room for all incarcerated people, however, and in
maintaining its borders it demonstrates its own forms of regulation and discipline. In particular,
those deemed guilty of sexual offending are excluded, as are those who are believed to have passed
information to staff (with some exceptions; Crewe, 2009). Ethnographers have described how
prisoners seek to control who gains admission by demanding to see prisoners’ paperwork, enabling
them to identify who is convicted of a sex offence (Schwaebe, 2005) or by abusing and excluding
those imprisoned in specialist units for people convicted of sex offences (Thurston, 1996).1 In so
doing, they demonstrate a form of collective identity work. Ugelvik (2014: 72) suggests that
incarcerated men are preoccupied by the desire to become ‘other than, or more than, ‘‘a prisoner’’’,
distinguishing themselves from others in an act of resistance to the ‘generalising optics’ (p. 106) of
the institution. By excluding rapists and grasses, as well as the particularly weak and childish, they
try to set themselves up as ‘real prisoners [ . . . ] adult, proper men who are not evil, not weak and
not immature’ (p. 108, emphases in original).
However, while the prisoner society might culturally and rhetorically oppose penal power,
sociologists have repeatedly shown that it, and the inmate code, can contribute to the maintenance
of order. Sykes and Messinger (1960; Sykes, 1958/2007), for example, maintained that the code
discouraged individuals from dramatic displays of resistance, created the stability which was
necessary for markets, and allowed inmate leaders to emerge who cooperated with officers, often
in ways which stretched the formal rules but nevertheless contributed to safety and predictability.
In large and racially divided US prisons, where prisoners now rarely know each other well enough
for this informal form of order to work, other bottom-up strategies have developed to contribute to
stability. Prison gangs, for instance, have grown and solidified to operate as a ‘low-cost producer of
governance’ (Skarbek, 2014: 99), gathering information about and even writing references for
people when they move between institutions, and punishing moral and trading infractions. Even in
institutions with a strong culture of active resistance to official authority, prisoners regulate their
peers in the wider service of order. Cohen and Taylor (1972: 84), for example, describe the social
world of a small high-security wing in the late 1960s and offer as an example of self-policing a rota
system established by prisoners to stand between the knives in their kitchen and ‘a new and
reputedly volatile inmate.’
The emergence in late-modernity of a new form of ‘tight’ penal power, most fully described by
Crewe (2009, 2011a), has challenged both the informal and social form of order described by
Sykes and Messinger, as well as the integrity and honour of the oppositional prisoner community.
Crewe argues that tight power is marked by its use of individualised conditions, indeterminate
sentences, bureaucratic decision-making, the invasive use of psychological profiling and risk
assessments, and processes of responsibilisation (see also Bosworth, 2007). This is a demanding
form of power, one which replicates the subjectifying tendencies of the Panopticon, and which
produces three new pains of imprisonment: the pain of indeterminacy, the pain of psychological
assessment and the pain of self-government. By demanding that prisoners focus on individual
progression, it discourages them from engaging in collective acts of resistance (Haney, 2010;
Mathiesen, 1965) and the fact that it often targets its gaze on prisoners’ relationships (Beckmann,
2016) means that most relationships are ‘cautious and limited’ (Liebling et al., 2011: 101). In
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England and Wales, it has promoted a ‘culture of atomized self-interest’ (Crewe, 2009: 229) and
‘apathetic individualism’ (p. 401) in which people still proclaim the value of the inmate code, for
example, by condemning those who ‘grass’ on other prisoners as ‘furtive and unmanly’ (p. 395),
but who rarely enforce it by punishing infractions.
Tight power both fragments the prisoner society, then, and works through it. Tove Pettersson
(2017: 89) describes how prison officers in a Swedish open unit for young people imposed small
collective punishments to ‘get the youths to steer one another in the direction of good behaviour’.
She considers this through a Foucauldian lens and argues that it demonstrates that power becomes
‘invisible’ as the youths take over ‘the disciplinary work of staff’ (p. 90). This is a strategy which is
very consciously followed in therapeutic prisons, which seek to disrupt the fundamental precepts
of the inmate code and of inmate culture, and to encourage prisoners to participate in the work of
policing. This disruption tends to be incomplete, and different normative codes often exist
alongside each other in therapeutic institutions (Waldram, 2012), but they go some way to disrupt
the ‘us and them’ of conventional prison culture. Haney (2010: 161), for example, described a
penal facility for mothers and found that many functioned as ‘minitherapists, [ . . . ] flexing their
newly formed therapeutic muscles’ and criticising and reporting their peers for poor behaviour.
Genders and Player (1995), similarly, found that residents at Grendon, an English therapeutic
community prison, shared information with prison staff, flattened the offender hierarchy and
(imperfectly) accepted those convicted of sex offences. Similarly, Stevens (2013: 112), who
conducted research in Grendon and other therapeutic community prisons, found that, while some
residents were unwilling to proffer information about the transgressive behaviour of their peers as
they feared the stigmatic label of being a ‘grass’ when they returned to mainstream prisons, the
commitment which many felt to the goals of the programme meant that they ‘reinterpreted
‘‘grassing’’ as constructive criticism, intended to help the participant’, and therefore felt com-
fortable doing it.2 In so doing, the residents demonstrated a form of ‘performative regulation’,
which Scott (2011) argues is particularly common in institutions which she deems reinventive.
Performative regulation takes place when ‘groups of people submit themselves to the authority of
an institution, internalize its values and enact them through mutual surveillance in an inmate
culture’ (p. 221). The motivations underlying performative regulation are simultaneously instru-
mental and ethical: those who are members of reinventive institutions are normatively committed
to them while also only being able to evaluate themselves and others in the terms set by the
institution, in a dynamic which Scott summarises as ‘manifest agency/latent coercion’ (p. 50).
Prisoners are more than mere instruments of institutional power, then, although the ways in
which they act are often shaped by it. In his description of Ila, a Norwegian therapeutic prison
which held many men convicted of sex offences, Mathiesen (1965: 47) shows that even highly
atomised groups of prisoners can resist the pains of imprisonment and challenge the seemingly
unfair distribution of resources through their use of censoriousness, defined as ‘criticism of those in
power for not following, in their behaviour, principles that are established as correct within the
social system in question.’ While censoriousness can be highly effectively, Mathiesen argues that
it comes from a place of weakness because it requires the complainer to adapt to the established
norms of the penal institution, rather than vice versa. Rowe (2016), on the other hand, has shown
how women prisoners use their knowledge of the disciplinary environment to their own ends, for
instance by grassing on their peers, as ways of resolving interpersonal tensions. In so doing, they
operate in the gaps of ‘the grid of discipline’ (Certeau, 1984: xiv, quoted in Rowe, 2016: 337),
using institutional means to work against institutional objectives and claw back power. Thus while
the collective self-regulation of incarcerated people sometimes helps to shore up institutional
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power, through ‘grassing’ or through performative regulation, at times the disciplinary work of
prisoners exists in competition with that of the prison authorities, as in the cases of prison gangs
(Skarbek, 2014), the quest to identify sex offenders (Ugelvik, 2014), or when prisoners make use of
institutional strategies in the way described by Rowe; this disciplinary work can also operate
vertically upwards to more directly challenge penal power, as described by Mathiesen. As we can
see, then, prisoners are not just regulated objects, they are also regulating subjects, and in different
conditions, they demonstrate allegiance to different normative orders.
These dynamics are particularly complex in the case of men convicted of sex offences, who in
many ways are doubly disciplined. On the one hand, they are subjected to intrusive, extensive and
shaming forms of monitoring and control by the state (McAlinden, 2007), pushed by risk
assessment and cognitive-behavioural treatment to see themselves as permanent ‘sex offenders’
(Lacombe, 2008). On the other hand, they are the primary targets of the prisoners’ regulatory
exertions, at constant risk of detection and exposure from those they live among, and thus excluded
from a community which could provide them with support or honour. Relative to those incar-
cerated for other offences, they are also less likely to have significant experience of incarceration
and thus to have strong loyalties to prisoner culture (Mathiesen, 1965). Many, although by no
means a majority, feel that their offences mean that there is something wrong with them and that
they need to be punished, leading them to desire intervention and to submit themselves to insti-
tutional power (Crewe and Ievins, 2019). Taken together, these factors suggest that these prisoners
might be particularly powerless and fragmented, the ‘perfectly individualized and constantly
visible’ (Foucault, 1975/1991: 201) objects of Foucault and Bentham’s imaginations.
As this article will go on to describe, however, this is not an adequate description of social
relationships in prisons for men convicted of sex offences. The article is based on research con-
ducted in an English medium-security prison for men convicted of sex offences, and it argues that
while these men were subjected to constricting forms of discipline, much of this ‘tightness’
(Crewe, 2011a) operated laterally, through the omnioptical (Crewe, 2009: 307) prisoner society. In
this prison, then, prisoners played the role of the inspector, observing, classifying and punishing
their peers, and in particular monitoring them for signs of sexual deviance. However, this process
was complex, and this lateral regulation did not always correspond well with the forms of regu-
lation demanded by the institution. Through this description, the article will challenge the over-
riding depiction in the literature of the prisoner society as something which either resists the penal
bulwark or which exists its gaps, but which either way is given shape by the institutional power
pressing down on it. Instead, it will describe the prisoner society as a normative system which
exists on at least some of its own terms.
Methods
In 2017, as part of a large-scale project of comparative research, an in-depth ethnographic study
was conducted at a large English medium-security prison which held around 1200 men convicted
of sex offences; it also held around 20 trans women, who had also been convicted of sex offences,
and who were held on wings alongside the male prisoners.3 The study sought to describe the way in
which penal power shaped the prisoner society, and tightness was one of its central orienting
concepts. The research was focused largely on two wings and it entailed extended periods of
participant observation, primarily conducted in public spaces on both wings. In addition, 45 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with prisoners, all of whom were selected opportunistically,
and one of whom was trans. Participants were serving sentences of a variety of lengths and for
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offences of different seriousness, and included Internet offences, contact and non-contact offences
against children, and the rape and sexual assault of adults. These interviews had a mean length of
just under three hours, often spread over several sessions, and covered issues such as staff–prisoner
relationships, risk discourse, and social relationships on the wing. All interviews were conducted in
a private room and all but one were audio-recorded.4 All were transcribed and then coded in full,
using a pre-determined conceptual framework that included ‘tightness’ and ‘social relations’, but
which left room for other themes, such as ‘lateral tightness’, to emerge inductively. The project
received full ethical approval.
Interest in tightness as a lateral phenomenon emerged during the period of participant obser-
vation, when it became clear that prisoners spent a lot of time monitoring how other people
interacted with female members of the research team. The power of this system of surveillance was
much more visible in interactions than it was describable in interviews. When asked, most pris-
oners maintained that they did not care how other prisoners judged them, although their actions and
the stories which they told belied this, and our field notes record numerous incidents of prisoners
commenting on who members of the team had been seen talking to or displaying awkwardness
about being seen talking to women in public spaces. As a result, mastering the field (Drake and
Harvey, 2014) and building research relationships became a delicate task, but these difficulties
revealed the pervasiveness of lateral tightness in this prison.
Monitoring, grassing and breaking boundaries
Forms of lateral regulation
You find out how strong people are in here, and you find out the reality of people in here. If you’re
constantly . . . everybody is under a microscope from everybody else, especially on this wing with being
on such a small wing. And you know people, you know what they’re really like, you know what their
foibles are. (Arjun)5
R: I’m a social analyst. I switch off to a degree, but my standby mode is probably ahead of everybody
else’s, so I see what’s going on. I notice stuff that sometimes I wish I didn’t.
I: Do you mean other people’s flirting, or just generally?
R: Just generally, yes. I see the social groupings. I see who is acting in a certain way towards other
prisoners. Elder gentlemen to younger ones, I see them befriending very fast. I notice quite a lot of
things like that. I notice how quickly certain key individuals flock to you when you walk onto the wing.
They’re completely oblivious to anybody else would notice that. (Neil)
As the above quotations from Arjun and Neil make clear, the men in this prison spent a lot of
time watching their peers and judging their behaviour. They were highly conscious that they lived
among people convicted of sex offences, but they were not solely interested in how people had
transgressed in the past. Instead, they sought to identify, monitor and, sometimes, change those
whom they believed still acted in accordance with their ‘sex offender’ identity while they were in
custody. They thus policed anything which they judged to be relevant to sexuality and sexual
offending, and people who spent too much time with female staff, trans women or young men were
objects of suspicion. This preoccupation was pervasive, and at times, these horizontal forms of
regulation linked up quite explicitly with institutional systems of control. For example, many
interview participants admitted to having passed information about inappropriate behaviour on to
prison staff. It was rare for prisoners to feel morally conflicted about this, or to deem that they were
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betraying their peers. In fact, most of the men considered that grassing was acceptable when the
behaviour was related to offending and sexuality, or that informing staff of such behaviour did not
count as grassing and thus was not a breach of the inmate code. Passing information to staff was
therefore widespread and rarely, if ever, penalised by other prisoners:
I don’t think it’s grassing if you report somebody for grooming somebody or for talking about kids or
for cutting things [images of children] out of the Argos catalogue.6 (Mick)
If something needs reporting, like there’s a threat to staff or someone else, I think it’s got to be done, ain’t it,
you can’t just sit back and think . . . Like for example where I was brought up, talking to authorities, it’s
easy, it’s just a no-no, do you know what I mean? It’s grassing and that’s what they call it. But there’s
instances where I’ve done it and I’ve felt a bit grubby about doing it but I’ve had to do it. Like for example
in my last jail I was on a[n offending behaviour] course with that lad, this old fella, and he was telling me
about a friend of his who was committing offences but wasn’t arrested. And I told him, I said ‘Listen, I’m
not, I’m not happy with you telling me this because then you’re involving me in this now and that guy is out
there [and] he’s got kids of his own now’. And I told him I was going to bring it up, I told him I was going to
tell the staff, and I did, I told the staff. In them instances, I think it’s acceptable because if you don’t say
something then you’re complicit in what’s going on and I don’t want to be involved in stuff. (John)
Those who were most active in their supervision of others were sometimes teased by their peers
for ‘getting ahead of themselves’; Joel, for example, had on several occasions passed information
about potentially coercive relationships to staff. The vigour with which he did this meant that he
was jokingly nicknamed ‘Governor’ by the people he lived with, but this teasing never slipped into
exclusion, abuse or violence.7
More often, though, this lateral regulation took subtler forms and functioned independently of
the formal prison system. Rumours spread quickly and often solidified into the warnings people
made to each other about suspect individuals. It was common for prisoners to say that they avoided
those whom they believed to behave inappropriately or to be convicted of particularly serious
things:
R: Like obviously you get some people who are here for very very heinous crimes, and you sort of try to
avoid them as much as possible so you don’t get associated with them.
I: How do you know?
R: They get pointed out [ . . . ]. They don’t tell you what they’re in for, they just say ‘He’s a bad person,
stay away from him’. (Reece)
Not all rumours were believed, but they were nevertheless disseminated, and young men were
especially likely to be warned to avoid apparently predatory people:
R: You do find out about other people and it does put you off people.
I: Do you find out because people gossip?
R: Yeah, yeah. And there are things I’ve heard about certain people here, on this wing, and some of it I
could believe but some of it I think ‘No, bollocks, absolute rubbish’. And obviously being one of the
youngest people in the prison as well, people have tried saying ‘People are going to be on you about
this, that and the other’. (Guy)
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Occasionally, those who were thought to behave inappropriately were directly confronted by
confident and high-status prisoners. Manwell, for instance, said that he and his friend used to call
out those who made what he called ‘sexually aggressive comments or comments about kids on the
TV’, and said that was a good strategy to get people ‘to modify their own behaviour’. Very rarely,
this confrontation became violent. Terry said that his cellmate used to write ‘invasive, faceless let-
ters’ to a girl he knew outside, asking her to send him ‘dirty shit’, and eventually he stopped being
able to ‘handle’ living with this man and so beat him up with his kettle.
Prisoners were highly conscious of this ever-present web of surveillance, and they pre-
emptively managed their behaviour in order to avoid adverse inferences being drawn – and cru-
cially, they were more often concerned that prisoners would make these judgements than that staff
would. Reece, for instance, said that he avoided making friends with trans prisoners because ‘if you
start getting too friendly with them, then people start pointing the finger at you’. When asked why
he was upset by being thus identified, his concern was the shame of being publicly misrecognised:
‘I just don’t want people talking about me and getting the wrong idea’. Similarly, Neil avoided
behaving too friendlily with female officers as he was afraid of being judged, and while he listed
practical motivations for being careful with his behaviour, it was clear that his first instinct was
simply to avoid the shaming experience of being seen:
R: On the outside, if you drop me into a bar or somewhere, I’m the worst, I’m the biggest flirt you will
ever meet. [ . . . ] But here, I turn it off, because I don’t want to be . . . It’s not so much what they [offi-
cers] think, it’s more what the other prisoners think. I see it when other prisoners are talking to people,
or the way that they will all sort of congregate around [female officers], and I just find their beha-
viour . . . perhaps because it’s so apparent to me, but I notice it. It’s transparent, and I think ‘Oh God.
Do people think that when I’m doing it as well?’
I: Why does it bother you, the idea of them thinking that?
R: It’s cause and effect in here. On the outside I can just walk away from things and go and do my own
things, but on here I’m on the wing, the last thing I want to be done is moved off the wing because they
think I’m trying to move in on somebody or whatever else. Or have something written on my NOMIS
[file] that I’ve got to deal with when I go out to Programmes.
Part of prisoners’ consciousness of how they were seen derived from the fact that their peers
were unpredictable judges – Neil said that ‘the staff are a lot more clued up than the prisoners’,
and therefore more able to accurately assess which behaviours were inappropriate – but it was also
a desire to avoid further mortification. Men in this institution carried the weight of their already-
spoiled identities (Goffman, 1963/1990) with them, and sought to avoid spoiling them even more
with their conduct in custody. They were caught in a grip which was exerted not just by the need to
progress through the system, but by the desire to maintain an honourable reputation, and these
social demands – which Frank described as feeling like ‘a valve’ – wrapped tightly around their
bodies and their behaviour. As in Bentham’s Panopticon, this was a subjectifying form of power,
one which placed significant behavioural demands on prisoners, but in this case, the power flowed
from and through the prisoner community.
Tightening the Panopticon
In part, this collective surveillance supported and upheld the more official forms of discipline and
supervision which were exerted by the authorities. In theory, the prison sought to promote
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cognitive transformation and risk management, but in practice very few interventions were
available, risk assessments and sentences plans were carried out unreliably and the majority of staff
involved in risk assessment, sentence planning and programme provision were not based on
residential wings or heavily involved in prisoners’ daily lives. Furthermore, the officers who
interacted with them more regularly did not see themselves as involved in rehabilitative work, as is
common for prison officers in late-modern prisons (Crewe, 2011b), and were not actively involved
in policing sexual behaviour. Officers were aware that prisoners complained about their inactivity,
but felt themselves to be powerless in this sphere:
It’s like, what am I gonna do? Go up to someone and say ‘Can you stop telling so-and-so you fancy them,
he doesn’t like it’? It does seem like in mains [mainstream prisons] they don’t want to tell you anything
whereas here they want to tell you everything and it almost feels like what do you want me to do? There’s
nothing I can do! You sort of just have to tell them to deal with it themselves. (Female officer, field notes)
As a result, formal power in this prison was experienced as ‘loose’ (Crewe and Ievins, 2020),
but prisoners’ constant presence allowed them to supplement the official strategies of surveillance
and monitoring, and thereby tighten the overall experience of imprisonment.
Many interview participants said that their peers acted deceptively towards staff but revealed
their ‘true selves’ when staff were not around. Ricky recounted the example of a man on his wing
whom he described as ‘OK with the staff’, but who became ‘creepy’ whenever staff were not
around, following people around and trying to touch them unnecessarily:
R: I’ve learnt recently that once the door closes, once the officers go, or they lock the door, everyone
changes, the real person comes out.
I: Really?
R: Their skills, manipulation skills come into play. The face that they don’t want officers to see is there.
[ . . . ] It seemed to be more evident when the door was shut and the officers weren’t around to see it. Or
nobody . . . he thought nobody was watching.
Not only did prisoners’ worm’s-eye view enable them to see more deeply than staff were able
to, they were also able to act on the basis of different forms of knowledge. They often stated, with
varying levels of sympathy and understanding, that staff were insufficiently discerning and failed
to intervene in inappropriate behaviour unless it had been officially classified as inappropriate by
some sort of formal corroboration:
There’s a certain person we don’t talk to here because he keeps talking to a very young vulnerable guy.
It’s very obvious to us, he’s a grown man, it’s obvious grooming, but there’s nothing you can do.
They’ve got to see it but they don’t care, they need evidence. (Prisoner, field notes)
Prisoners, on the other hand, were unconstrained by the requirement to act on the basis of hard
evidence, and thus were able to police what was merely ‘obvious’. They often claimed a sort of
‘practical consciousness’ (Giddens, 1991), a ‘second nature’ (Rory) or a ‘radar’ (Ricky) which
enabled them to ‘spot’ (Robert) people who were particularly sexually deviant.
The intensity with which prisoners observed and regulated each other was partly indicative of
the genuine anxiety which they felt around each other, an anxiety which was in some cases rooted
in experiences of sexual harassment and abuse before or during custody. More often, this desire to
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monitor peers was nourished by the feelings of stain (Ievins, in press) – psychological and moral
contamination – which people experienced as a result of living alongside others convicted of
unpleasant offences and hearing them talk about what they had done. However, the way prisoners
talked about and acted on their anxiety appeared to have been shaped by the form of power
operating in the prison in which they were held and by the image of the ‘sex offender’ which runs
through penal discourses. They described each other using a similar language of pathological
dangerousness to that used by prison staff, often accusing each other of manipulation and ‘parallel
offending’ and attempting to explain each other’s behaviour by reference to their purported
offences.8 Carlton, for example, insisted that prisoners’ attempts to get jobs in prison for instru-
mental purposes demonstrated their inherently deviant identities, even though later in his interview
he criticised prison psychologists for accusing him of the same thing:
What I see it as is parallel offending. So, some of these guys have been very manipulative, very con-
trolling in their offending behaviour outside of prison. They come to prison and they get jobs that give
them the status and the influence with staff to be able to manipulate things to their advantage.
Like staff, prisoners drew stark distinctions between what ‘sex offenders’ do and think, and
what ‘normal people’ do and think. They thus pathologised any sexually inflected behaviour, see-
ing it as a sign of inherent dangerousness:
I definitely think there is a difference between – I don’t know how to put this because ‘the normal’ is
not the correct word, but the normal brain and the sex offender brain. Because little conversations that
you have, like I’ll watch a TV programme and I’ll think, ‘Wow, I can’t believe they’ve done this and
that!’ and someone else will go, ‘Fucking hell, did you see her tits?’ It’s like, really? They’ve just done
a massive archaeological dig and found remains of this and that, and all you can think of is the low-cut
top she was wearing while she was digging the hole. (Mick)
In her ethnography of a Canadian prison-based cognitive-behavioural treatment programme for
men convicted of sex offences, Dany Lacombe (2008) argued that such men are ‘consumed by
sex’, that every aspect of their history and identity is seen through the distorting lens of their con-
viction. In the prison which is the focus of this article, prisoners looked at their peers with a simi-
larly simplifying gaze, interpreting their every action in a manner which was consistent with their
pre-assigned identity.
That prisoners replicated the discourses and strategies of official penal power in part indicates
how deeply these discourses and tight forms of power had penetrated the prisoner community. By
policing their peers, many men in this prison demonstrated the self-governance which is one of the
key strategies of late-modern penal power and performed the behavioural change which had been
incentivised by the institution. They were no longer objects of risk with faulty sexualities, and they
avoided and regulated those who were. They became agents in the Panopticon to show that they did
not need to be watched by it. Their desire to differentiate themselves was not narrowly instru-
mental, however. Troy, for instance, said that he was in his cell one day when an ‘unsavoury
character’, in his words, came in and started making sexually inappropriate comments about
children on the television. He immediately reported this to the staff: ‘I went and reported it
straightaway. I said ‘‘I know you write down who we talk to, but don’t associate him as my friend.
He’s not.’’’ His motivations were partly mercenary – he knew that the prison was worried about the
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development of grooming rings, and he did not want anyone to think that he might be doing that as
it could affect his licence conditions or his coming parole hearing – and partly moral:
I: If something like that ends up on your record, why does that bother you? Is that because of your
parole?
R: It bothers me because [ . . . ] although I’m a sex offender, it does upset me some of the things you see
on television that some people do. And I sit and think I know I’m classed as one, but why they should
do that, I don’t know.
I: Yes, so it’s not that it’s to do with if you’re seen hanging out with the wrong person, that might have a
bad outcome for you, it’s also that if you’re seen hanging out with a bad person it’s partly a moral
thing? You don’t want to be seen as –
R: They’ll assume that I’m the same, yes.
I: And that matters even if that doesn’t have any effect on your life, it still matters to you?
R: Yes, because I want it to be seen that I have rehabilitated and I want it to be seen that I am trying
to do my best for myself and repair the damage I’ve caused. But people like that are not going to
help you.
Similarly, Joel had on several occasions asked questions about, and sometimes told staff about
relationships which he found disturbing. In so doing, he demonstrated some confusion about his
own personal loyalties:
I: Do you feel more loyal to the staff and to that end of the prison than to the prisoner end?
R: It’s a difficult situation because I am a prisoner. I am a prisoner. I obviously always will be a pris-
oner and nothing more than a prisoner, so I would never put myself in that same ballpark as staff. But if
I feel something is important and they need to know because it intrinsically puts someone else at risk or
in danger, I will always inform them [staff]. Be it [danger from] themselves or be it from others. Yes,
that can create grief from other prisoners but at the end of the day, I need to deal with my own con-
science. My conscience and my morals is more important than that. I have skewed my morals in the
past. I’m not going to do that again. If that causes me extra problems, so be it.
In a great many cases, prisoners’ moral instincts aligned with the behavioural demands placed
on them by the prison and this normatively motivated lateral regulation thus broke down the dis-
tinction between staff as the discipliners and prisoners as the disciplined. While not all prisoners
shared information with staff as willingly as Troy and Joel did, the vast majority shared the desire
of staff to manage and control sexual behaviour in the interests of what they believed to be safety
and propriety. Rather than representing a deviant subculture, then, the prisoner community sus-
tained a normative system which appeared to correspond with that which was advocated for by the
penal authorities. Whereas Bentham clearly feared that the mob of prisoners might form a norma-
tive community which resisted the discipline he hoped to impose, here we see that discipline can
work through the prisoner society.
The prisoner society as an independent normative community
Prisoners’ regulatory gaze was not solely targeted at their peers, however, and it did not always
mirror that encouraged by the prison authorities. Disagreements occurred between prisoners and
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staff about what counted as sexual offending, about how to identify it, and about what should be
done about it. The prisoner-led system of regulation was not simply an extension of the official
system of discipline, then, but an independent normative system which at times corresponded, and
at times clashed, with the forms of power exerted by the prison. Imagined this way, we can see that
the primary task of this prisoner self-regulation was neither to materially nor to symbolically resist
penal power, as is often described as the main goal of the prisoner community, but to tackle
sexually inappropriate behaviour, wherever it was found. Prisoners frequently raised censorious
critique (Mathiesen, 1965) against staff for not intervening enough, or for demonstrating inap-
propriate behaviour themselves. Often, this censure was directed at the prison as an institution, for
instance when prisoners complained that it did not offer enough treatment programmes, or when
Frank criticised the prison’s Security department for allowing prisoners to have access to poten-
tially corrupting material, even though prisoners had tried to remove it:
R: There’s a book over there on that trolley that has been withdrawn by Security. It’s a manga book but
it is actually quite horrific to look at. There are some real dodgy pictures in there, and someone actually
came in and flagged it up a few weeks ago.
I: A prisoner?
R: A prisoner, yeah. And the librarians contacted Security and they took it away for a bit. I don’t know
why they’ve brought it back because they have actually told us to take it off the shelves.
These criticisms were sometimes based on stereotyped assumptions about the nature of sexual
offending and the character of those who commit them, rather than on a scientific assessment of
risk. AJ, for example, insisted that it was inappropriate that one of the prison’s workshops produced
camouflage netting:
Why are you teaching sex offenders how to make camouflage netting? [ . . . ] You’re teaching a man
how to camouflage himself, so he can go and sit outside a school and never be seen, or outside of a
playground in a bush.
At other times, this censorious critique was directed at prison officers for not policing sexually
inappropriate behaviour and language enough. These complaints were often passionate, and spoke
both to the depth of prisoners’ disgust at inappropriate behaviour and their frustration with the
prison for failing to live up to its own rhetoric. Mick, for example, spoke about seeing another pris-
oner, in his words, ‘groom’ a much younger man for three weeks, and being unable to stop it or to
persuade staff to stop it:
You know when you know something’s about to happen and you get that sinking feeling? It’s like that
times one hundred and then a massive feeling of guilt, feeling scared and then knowing that you should
have done something, or should do something. That’s all the feelings I used to feel as a kid. Knowing
what was happening and obviously not being able to protect my brother. When I see things that are
happening here, I get that feeling again and it really upsets me and I have to go in my room, and that
makes me even more angry, like really fucking angry. I’m gritting my teeth! And they let it happen!
That’s what fucks me off. They let it happen. Three weeks, they let that happen for! And one of them
[the officers] the other week said . . . Someone [had] said ‘Do you enjoy your job?’ And he went ‘I
really enjoy my job because I protect the public from people like you.’ I thought ‘Do you really? What,
you really protect the people, do you?’ And I thought when this fucking horrible bastard thing was
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happening ‘You protect the public, do you? You’re letting this go on for three weeks and that’s pro-
tecting the public, is it? You’re letting that guy parallel offend for three weeks and that’s protecting
the public’.
It is significant that these complaints about under-policing came from prisoners who did not
consider themselves to pose any risk (because they said they were not guilty, or because they main-
tained that their offence did not say anything about who they were), as well as from the few who
believed that their own behaviour and sexual identity were problematic and benefitted from inter-
vention. It was also significant that it was not just directed at the failure to police behaviour which
directly affected them. Irrespective, all prisoners believed that it was right for the prison to inter-
vene in matters related to sexual deviance and sexual danger.
Prisoners’ disciplinary gaze did not only operate on other prisoners, then. They also watched
and judged staff, condemning them for enabling or even encouraging sexually inappropriate
behaviour. One male member of civilian staff was notorious among prisoners for being (they said)
inappropriately tactile with women, and prisoners frequently commented on the irony of his
behaviour: ‘I’m not being funny, this is a sex offenders’ prison, he should be setting us a good
example!’ (prisoner, field notes). Others complained that female staff did not set tight enough
boundaries: ‘I find a lot of inmates cross the line because they’re allowed to’ (Jude). Terry
complained about a specific incident involving a female officer and AJ, a prisoner on his wing:
She had her ID in her [chest] pocket and AJ just goes up and puts his hand in there on her breast and he
pulls it out and she just spoke to him as though nothing happened, she didn’t give a shit. The whole
wing [ . . . ] looked at her and was like ‘What the fuck was that?’.
Every time a woman came on the wing, AJ would speak to them and try to flirt with them, Terry
said: ‘It is every female officer, any new person, psychologists. [ . . . ] The most obvious offending
behaviour is right in front of you and it is not being tackled’. Terry thought that AJ should be
wrapped up more tightly, in a ‘straitjacket’, he suggested.
In making these complaints about prison staff, prisoners imposed constraints on the sorts of
staff–prisoner relationships that were able to develop, demonstrating the prisoner community’s
ability to influence the operation of penal power. Researchers have repeatedly found that prison
officers often have distant relationships with men convicted of sex offences, and they have tended
to attribute this to the negative attitudes officers hold towards these men (Blagden et al., 2017;
Kjelsberg and Loos, 2008). In this case, however, it was prisoners’ anxiety about being judged
which contributed to distance. Elsewhere in his interview, Terry discussed a female officer, whom
he described as ‘the reasonably good-looking one’, and said that ‘rumours spread’ whenever a
prisoner was seen speaking to her for too long. This officer was a frequent topic of conversation on
the wing: while many of the men insisted that she was flirtatious and inappropriate, others said that
she was simply young, friendly, and sought to actively engage with people. She was aware of how
she was judged, and reported that she tried to limit her interactions with people to protect her
reputation. Terry himself described how her behaviour was shaped by the way she was observed by
prisoners: ‘At the beginning you think ‘‘Rude woman’’, then you realise, oh, okay, eyes are on you
so you’ve got to move on’. Other prisoners said that they deliberately avoided talking to this and
other female officers, in order to stop ‘Chinese whispers’ (Rory) from starting.
The debate concerning the propriety of this officer reflected the inconsistency of this prisoner-
led system of regulation. It is difficult to determine what behaviour is sexually motivated, sexually
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inappropriate or indicative of a sexually deviant identity. Sexuality is, after all, invisible (if it exists
at all as an independent object and sphere of life (Foucault, 1976/1998)), but prisoners insisted that
they were instinctively able to recognise and classify sexual deviance without relying on the
authority of more officially recognised mechanisms such as the ‘psy-disciplines’ (Rose, 1990):
You can tell by people, can’t you. Their attitudes, the way people talk about it and the way people act
about things. I’ve never done any psychology or anything like that, so I’m no expert. But I don’t know,
there’s something about some people that you can just tell isn’t right. (Guy)
I mean it’s obvious the ones that are guilty, the way that they talk. You know? I mean you might get
someone who is in for rape, you might get someone who ain’t frightened to say ‘Oh I didn’t do that, you
know what I mean, I have respect for this person, I have respect for them’. Then they turn round and say
you know, to a female or something, ‘Oh she’s a right effing slag, she deserves a slap’. Well if you’re
going to talk about an officer like that then obviously you’ve spoke to your girlfriend like that, and if
she’s accused you of rape then the chances are that you did it because of the way that you treat female
people. You know? I mean it stands to reason. I mean I’m not a psychologist, but I like studying people.
(Reece)
However, this technology was not impartially used and was, in fact, heavily influenced by
prisoners’ assumptions about gender. Prisoners who were old, strange-looking, gay or trans –
and who therefore existed outside the norm of acceptable masculinity – were likely to be
identified as sexually problematic, as were those whose position in the prisoner economy
made them highly visible to their peers. Robert, for instance, said that if he started hanging
around with gay people or old people, this would in itself mean that people made assumptions
or started asking questions: ‘Why are you hanging around with them? [ . . . ] Oh you’re getting
groomed, they’re touching you up’.
In its selection of targets, then, this regulatory gaze replicated some of the hypermasculine
and heteronormative ideals of mainstream prison culture, and while prisoners were hypervigilant
regarding sexual risk, they were most likely to identify it in people who, in appearance at least,
resembled the faulty monstrous figures of popular imagination. Theorists of prison masculinity
have argued that the social exclusion of men convicted of sex offences implies a categorical
difference between normal and abnormal men, and helps to reinforce the idea that ‘normal
manhood remains unproblematic’ (Sim, 1994: 108) by directing all negative attention to a few
scapegoats. Similar processes were arguably at play here, and certainly prisoners considered
sexual violence to be something caused by individual pathologies rather than cultural norms or
systems of power. The role of mainstream masculinity in promoting or enabling sexual offending
was never discussed by prisoners, and female staff were often blamed for provoking sexual
attention:
This is going to sound really bad, and please don’t take this like . . . That’s the sort of person that is
likely to invoke something within a sex offender. She is likely to get dragged into a cell one day, and
that’s horrendous to think. I’m not saying she has brought it upon herself, because no one should do that
to anyone, but she’s kind of giving away the wrong signals. There are dangerous people in here that
haven’t thought twice about doing that sort of thing. (Mick)
The direction of prisoners’ regulatory gaze was thus determined, not just by the risk-
focused and psychologically inflected demands of the institution, but by their own beliefs
14 Incarceration 1(1)
and norms about sexuality and masculinity. By monitoring and disciplining their peers,
they drew on both discourses, in a way which made their omnioptical gaze both tight and
confusing.
Conclusion: The tightness of the crowd
The form of lateral regulation which I have described in this article was tight and disciplinarian. It
operated on the most fundamental aspects of prisoners’ beings – their sexuality, their bodies and
their relationships – and thus sought to change and control their souls. It created in all who lived
and worked in the prison the constant fear of being watched, and the continual requirement that
they monitor themselves and their behaviours. It saw danger in most people and in nearly all
interactions, although some people were a source of more danger than others. But whereas the
Panopticon exerted discipline through the inspector in his tower, the discipline which I have
described in this article was primarily exerted from and through the prisoners. To some extent, this
is consistent with Foucault’s understanding of capillary power (Foucault, 1980), a power which
flows from the centre to the margins, and which makes prisoners instruments of this authority. But
as we have seen, the lateral regulation which operated in this prison did not always harmonise with
the demands made by the institution, nor did it clearly originate in the centre. Instead, it was much
less consolidated, its source was harder to identify, and the institutional gaze was blurred. It was
not exerted by an external authoritative figure, one who was perhaps distant and inconsistent but at
least, in theory, identifiable. Instead, it was a diffuse form of discipline, one which was exerted
from below, was based on an explicitly non-scientific form of knowledge, and which struggled
even to know where to look.
The tightness of the late-modern prison has been metaphorically described as a grip (Crewe,
2011a), as something which wraps around prisoners and demands they behave in certain ways,
or as a fairground claw (Crewe and Ievins, 2020), a centralised power which prisoners must
be ready to be gripped by but which may never come to collect them. The lateral regulation
which functioned in this prison was more akin to the tightness of the crowd: suffocating,
disorienting, chaotic, and impossible to escape. Unlike a claw or a grip, which imposes
control from an identifiable outside figure, the crowd imposes pressure from all directions and
pushes people in all directions. Each individual member of the crowd contributes to its power,
at the same time as being subjected to it. The shape which it takes is influenced by the gaps
which it is able to fill, but its course is difficult to predict, and it is propelled by its own
logics. The social dynamics in this prison, then, suggest that Bentham was correct to fear that
the frenzied force of the crowd would challenge the influence of the singular inspector.
Prisoners believed that their peers were dangerous, but they were held in an environment
which did not appear to do much about it. They, therefore, filled this gap, disciplining each
other in a way which sometimes supported and sometimes conflicted with institutional
objectives, but was ultimately driven by prisoners’ normative instincts. These instincts had
their own social, cultural and psychobiographical roots, and were not solely shaped by the
prison in which prisoners were held. In this context, the deficiencies of the inspector’s gaze
fed the power of the crowd, but they were not solely responsible for it.
Through this description of lateral systems of regulation among prisoners convicted of sex
offences, I hope that I have challenged some of the assumptions embedded in previous analyses of
the relationship between penal power and the prisoner society, in particular that the latter takes
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shape primarily in response to the former. In so doing, I build on the work of Ryan Williams
(2017), who has critiqued prison sociologists’ singular analytic focus on dynamics of power and
resistance and argued that there is value in describing prison life through a moral lens. Using this
lens allows us to see lateral tightness as a form of collective regulation which is incentivised and
encouraged by formal strategies of power but which also derives from prisoners’ own normative
impulses. These impulses are likely to be particularly visible in prisons for men convicted of sex
offences, where issues of sex and morality are highly salient, where prisoners’ greater compliance
allows moral issues to come to the fore, and where the widespread moral agreement between staff
and prisoners means areas of disagreement are highlighted. However, the argument that prisoner
regulation is normatively motivated is not limited to prisons of this category, and future work
should consider the normative bases of the prisoner community in other types of institution.
Acknowledgements
Sincere thanks to the other members of the COMPEN team, Professor Ben Crewe and Drs Julie
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Notes
1. The fact that prisoners are held on these units indicates that penal authorities do not straightforwardly dis-
approve of the exclusion of people convicted of sex offences. Like prisoners, prison officers have negative
attitudes towards people with such convictions (Kjelsberg and Loos, 2008), and it has been argued that
holding them separately from mainstream prisoners, as tends to be the case in jurisdictions like England
and Wales, institutionalises and formalises the prisoner hierarchy (Mann, 2016).
2. Bill, one of the men interviewed by Stevens (2013: 113), put this in quite stark terms: ‘In this environment,
we are the best police. We know what’s going on. The staff don’t know what goes on upstairs. It’s us that
brings it into the room and says ‘‘You threatened him’’‘.
3. For more details of the comparative project, please see www.compen.crim.cam.ac.uk.
4. Notes were taken during the one interview that was not audio-recorded.
5. All names are pseudonyms, and any potential identifiers have been removed.
6. Argos is a popular British catalogue retailer.
7. ‘Governor’: a prison manager.
8. Offence paralleling behaviour is a term used by psychologists to describe behaviour which is ‘functionally
similar to behavioural sequences involved in previous criminal acts’ (Daffern et al., 2007: 267), and which
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is often considered to be a risk factor (Akerman and Beech, 2013). The term ‘parallel offending’ is com-
monly used by prisoners and staff to describe any behaviour which seems to echo offending behaviour. As
a term, it is used quite generally, and often by people without any psychological expertise.
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